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I. INTRODUCTION
The ocean never sleeps. All day and night it pounds on the shore,
eroding some of the most sought-after and valuable property in the
world. Of course, shoreline property owners want to protect their
land from erosion, often by constructing seawalls.' But these walls
can come at a high price; they can cause the beach in front of them
to disappear.2
Beaches are of vital recreational and commercial value in Hawai'i,
and they are protected by the Public Trust Doctrine.3 Under the doc-
trine, all states hold their submerged lands and navigable waters in
trust for the public. The doctrine compels Hawai'i to preserve sub-
4
merged land, up to the high water mark, for public uses.
When the ocean threatens private buildings, private and public in-
terests in trust lands clash. The State of Hawai'i and its counties
typically allow landowners to armor the shore when the ocean is
within a few dozen feet of a habitable structure. By allowing this
armoring, which may ultimately destroy Public Trust land, the state
is failing in its duty to protect beaches for the benefit of future gen-
erations.5 The state cannot allow armoring that will harm the Public
Trust. Rather, to fulfill its fiduciary duty to the public, the state must
allow nature to claim land and structures along the shore.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Hawai'i, William S. Richardson School of
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1. See infra Part lI.B.
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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Part II of this comment will describe coastal processes and the ef-
fects of seawalls on beaches. Part III will discuss the Public Trust
Doctrine, at common law and in Hawai'i, and Part IV will explore
the Public Trust implications of shoreline armoring. Ultimately, the
state should allow shoreline owners to use their land while it still
exists, but require them to accept that the risk of erosion falls on
them. It is a fair way to preserve the rights of the public while still
allowing reasonable use of private property.
II. SHORELINE ARMORING CAUSES BEACH Loss
The only reliable aspect of the shoreline is constant change. 6 In-
deed, beaches are "one of Earth's most dynamic environments."
7
Beaches and dunes often depend on each other for survival, as sand
constantly shifts among offshore sandbars, the beach, and inland
dunes.8 When a seawall interferes with this system on a chronically
eroding beach, that beach will eventually disappear. 9 Thus, shore-
line armoring can harm dynamic coastal systems. Unfortunately, as
shorelines erode and sea levels rise, '0 coastal landowners in Hawai'i
turn to seawalls to protect their land, despite the well-established
detrimental effects of armoring.
A. Beaches and Dunes are Part of an Interconnected System That
Naturally Preserves Sandy Beaches
Beaches and landward dunes work together to preserve sand, even
if the coast is eroding.'1 Many coastal geologists prefer the term
"shoreline retreat" to "coastal erosion" because it indicates that as
6. Charles H. Fletcher et al., On the Shores of Paradise 4 (Apr. 29, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/coasts/publications/shores/
index.html) [hereinafter Fletcher, On the Shores].
7. Id.
8. See id. at ll.
9. Charles H. Fletcher et al., Beach Loss Along Armored Shorelines on Oahu,
Hawaiian Islands, 13 J. COASTAL REs. 209, 214 (197); interview with Dr. Charles
Fletcher, Chair, Dep't of Geology & Geophysics, Univ. of Haw., in Honolulu,
Haw. (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Dr. Fletcher 1].
10. See EILEEN L. SHEA ET AL., PREPARING FOR A CHANGING CLIMATE 32
(2001); see also El-Mohamady Eid & Cornelis H. Hulsbergen, Sea Level Rise and
Coastal Zone Management, in CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENCE, IMPACTS AND POLICY
301, 305 (J. Jager & H.L. Ferguson eds., 1993).
11. Fletcher, On the Shores, supra note 6, at 1-2.
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the shoreline moves landward, sand is not necessarily lost. 12 Often,
the beach is just the outer edge of a long layer of sand that extends
inland. 13 In such systems, waves across the shore and currents along
it create "a three-dimensional sand sharing system."1 4 Accordingly,
"impacts to sand resources in one area may echo" throughout the
entire system, affecting even distant beaches. 15
Beaches and dunes store sand when the ocean is calm, and then re-
lease it offshore when larger storm waves come in. 16 While off-
shore, the sand resides in equilibrium. Later, "fair weather waves"
move it back onto the beach, and "onshore winds and high tides"
move it landward to the dunes.' 7 This offshore retreat and inland
storage puts beaches in a state of dynamic equilibrium, with sand
ebbing and flowing, but always remaining part of a larger quasi-
stable system.1 8 These sandy beach systems are virtually "indestruc-
tible" without human interference.19 Beach loss occurs when people
interrupt this flow.
B. Shoreline Armoring Has Negative Effects on Many Sandy
Beaches
With the ocean creeping ever closer to their buildings, many shore-
line owners preserve their land with seawalls, despite the harm ar-
moring does to coastal resources. This trend has destroyed beaches.
Specifically, "[t]he reliance upon shoreline armoring to mitigate
coastal erosion [in Hawai'i] . . . has instead produced widespread
beach erosion resulting in beach narrowing and loss." 20 Landowners
have destroyed twenty-five percent of O'ahu's beaches, and 8 kilo-
meters of Maui's, by armoring.21 There are three primary contexts
in which shoreline armoring will cause beach loss.
22
12. Id.
13. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
14. E-mail from Dr. Charles Fletcher, Chair, Dep't of Geology & Geophysics,
Univ. of Haw. (Apr. 26, 2008, 11:52 HST) (on file with author).
15. Id.
16. Fletcher, On the Shores, supra note 6, at 13.
17. Id.; E-mail from Dr. Charles Fletcher, supra note 14.
18. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
19. Fletcher, On the Shores, supra note 6, at 4.
20. Fletcher et al., supra note 9, at 214.
21. Fletcher, On the Shores, supra note 6, at 16.
22. Interview with Dr. Charles Fletcher, Chair, Dep't of Geology & Geophys-
ics, Univ. of Haw., in Honolulu, Haw. (Apr. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with
Dr. Fletcher II].
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First, if a landowner constructs a seawall on a shoreline suffering
from chronic long-term erosion, the beach in front of the wall will
narrow and disappear.23 This is because "artificially fixing the
shoreline . . .removes upland sand from the sediment budget and
reduces sand supplies to the beach;" 24 dunes become impacted be-
hind the armoring, so that they can no longer supply the beach with
sand. On a chronically eroding shore, the dunes are a primary
source of sand.26 Hence, when armoring cuts them off from a
chronically eroding beach, that beach will be lost.
Second, if a particular beach gains and loses large amounts of sand
periodically, it is vulnerable to permanent beach loss from armoring.
Specifically, as these shorelines retreat, erosion begins to threaten
inland structures. Accordingly, landowners construct walls when the
beach is near its minimum width.27 Under normal circumstances,
these beaches would rebound and begin to accrete sand again.28
However, waves reflect forcefully off of seawalls, effectively dou-
bling the amount of energy on sand in front of them.29 This in-
creased energy can interfere with accreting sand, and prevent it from
returning and stabilizing in front of the wall. 30  This makes these
beaches less likely to accrete. 31 Normally, a beach in this context
would recover, even after a period of intense erosion. 32 However,
with a seawall disrupting energy absorption at the shore, recovery is
much less likely. 33 Thus, a landowner armoring to prevent tempo-
rary erosion runs the risk of making that erosion permanent.
34
23. Fletcher et al., supra note 9, at 214.
24. Id. (citing N.C. Kraus, The Effects of Seawalls on the Beach: An Extended
Literature Review, 4 J. COASTAL RES,. (SPECIAL IssuE) 4 (1988); O.H. Pilkey &
H.L. Wright, Seawalls Versus Beaches, 4 J. COASTAL RES., (SPECIAL ISSUE) 4
(1988)).
25. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
26. E-mail from Dr. Charles Fletcher, supra note 14; Fletcher, On the Shores,
supra note 6, at 144.
27. Interview with Dr. Fletcher II, supra note 22.
28. Id.
29. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
30. Id.; Interview with Dr. Fletcher II, supra note 22.
31. Interview with Dr. Fletcher II, supra note 22.
32. Id.
33. E-mail from Dr. Charles Fletcher, supra note 14; see Fletcher, On the
Shores, supra note 6, at 14.
34. Interview with Dr. Fletcher II, supra note 22.
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Finally, even steadily accreting beaches may be vulnerable to
beach loss caused by armoring. In particular, if accretion on a pre-
viously eroded shore has been stable for twenty years, the shoreline
landowner may quiet title on the re-accreted land.36 Once the title in
the new land passes to the coastal landowner, he or she may build on
it. Then, if the accreted land begins to erode a ain, the landowner
will need to armor to protect the new structures. By armoring, the
landowner will cut the accreted sand off from the beach.38 In turn,
this will interrupt the dynamic ebb and flow of the beach-dune sys-
tem, and will lead to beach narrowing and loss in front of the wall.39
The public lost much of south Lanikai beach on O'ahu through such
a chain of events, and recent data indicates a shift from accretion to
erosion may lead to a similar situation on Kailua Beach.40 Indeed, in
an era of sea level rise, 4 1 such shifts from stable accretion to erosion
are likely to become even more common.
42
Ultimately, once gone, beaches eroded by armoring will not return
without further intervention. Specifically, there appears to be no
"periodicity to loss and recovery" near seawalls, and accordingly,
"presently degraded beach segments are unlikely to experience natu-
ral recovery." 43 Thus, seawalls can destroy the beaches in front of
them. However, if landowners allowed their seawalls to degrade,
many of the beaches now lost would return.44
In Morgan v. Planning Department,45 the Hawai'i Supreme Court
acknowledged that the negative effects of seawalls on coastlines are
"of great importance to the people of Hawai'i.,,46 In Morgan, the
trial court relied on expert testimony from Dr. Charles Fletcher, Pro-
fessor and Chairperson of the Department of Geology & Geophysics
35. Id.
36. HAw. REV. STAT § 669-1(e) (Supp. 2007).
37. Interview with Dr. Fletcher II, supra note 22.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; E-mail from Dr. Charles Fletcher, supra note 14; see Fletcher, On the
Shores, supra note 6, at 16.
41. See EILEEN L. SHEA ET AL., supra note 10, at 32; see also El-Mohamady
Eid & Comelis H. Hulsbergen, supra note 10, at 305.
42. E-mail from Dr. Charles Fletcher, supra note 14.
43. Fletcher et al., supra note 9, at 214.
44. Interview with Dr. Fletcher II, supra note 22.
45. Morgan v. Planning Dept., County of Kauai, 104 Haw. 173, 86 P.3d 982
(2004).
46. See id. at 181, 86 P.3d at 990.
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at the University of Hawai'i at Mdnoa. His testimony established
that the seawall in question "caused significant adverse environ-
mental effects to the shoreline" and shoreline area, and that armoring
had "led to an increased rate of erosion and loss of beach fronting
the seawall. ' 47 The controversy in that case involved a phenomenon
known as flanking, in which beaches on either side of a new seawall
experience dramatically increased erosion.48 Specifically, the beach
south of the seawall in Morgan originally had only "negligible" ero-
sion. After the wall was constructed, that beach began to erode more
than ten feet per year.49 Although Morgan was not decided on Pub-
lic Trust principles, the decision made clear the Hawai'i Supreme
Court accepts the destructive effects of seawalls, and Hawai'i trial
courts can rely on expert testimony from scientists to establish those
effects.
Not every seawall causes erosion. In particular, if there is no dune
behind the wall, but rather rock or clay, the wall is less likely to
cause beach loss because no sand will be trapped behind it.50 In ad-
dition, if a wall is well set back from the shoreline, it is less likely to
disrupt accreting sand because no waves reflect off of it.51 Simi-
larly, if the beach in front of such a wall is accreting rather than
eroding, the wall is less likely to harm the beach-dune system be-
cause such a system is not immediately dependent on sand im-
pounded behind the wall. 52
Nevertheless, many beaches in Hawai'i would be negatively af-
fected by armoring.53 In addition, landowners abutting accreting
beaches rarely request permission to armor; generally, owners faced
with chronic erosion are the ones who apply to the state or county to
build seawalls. 54 The shoreline armoring most valuable to landown-
ers is generally of the type most destructive to beaches. One might
assume that the western common law, with its exaltation of private
property rights, would resolve this conflict in favor of shoreline
property owners. But quite the contrary, under the common law
47. Id. at 183, 86 P.3d at 992.
48. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
49. Morgan, 104 Haw. at 184 n. 11, 86 P.3d at 993 n.11.
50. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
51. Id.; Fletcher et al., supra note 9, at 214.
52. Fletcher et al., supra note 9, at 214; Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra
note 9.
53. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
54 Id.
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Public Trust Doctrine, it is the public's interests in submerged lands
that prevail, and the private landowner who must suffer the conse-
quences of erosion.
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DocTRiNE: ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION
IN HAWAI'i
The Public Trust Doctrine has ancient roots in Hawai'i, both in
Roman law, and in traditional Hawaiian custom. 55 In particular, the
English common law adopted Roman Public Trust principles, while
increasing private ownership of the shore. 56 Later, these common
law principles carried over into the colonies, and ultimately to the
American states. 57 Now, each state has a slightly different interpre-
tation of the Public Trust. 58 Hawai'i interprets the doctrine broadly
and consistently with ancient Hawaiian usage, to include as much
land as reasonably possible in its scope.
A. The Basis for the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine
Roman law acknowledged "things which are naturally every-
body's," including "air, flowing water, the sea, and the sea-shore." 60
Accordingly, "nobody [could] be stopped from going on to the sea-
shore," 61 where "[t]he sea-shore extend[ed] as far as the highest win-
55. Compare Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658
P.2d 709, 718 (Ca. 1983), DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE TO WORK 3-4 (2nd ed. 1997), and Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Con-
cept: An Historical Concept With Modem Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV.
835, 844 (1982), with McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 185, 504
P.2d 1330, 1338 (1973).
56. Nat '7 Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 718; SLADE ET AL., supra note 55, at 4-5;
Butler, supra note 55, at 852.
57. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1894); see also Butler, supra note
55, at 867-78.
58. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26; Butler, supra note 55, at 892.
59. See County of Haw. v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 177, 517 P.2d 57, 58
(1973) (holding "[p]ublic policy favors extending to public use and ownership as
much of Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably possible"); see also McBryde Sugar
Co., 504 P.2d at 1338.
60. JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 2.1.1 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987).
61. Id.
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ter tide." 62 Thus, in ancient Roman law, private property abutting
waterways was subject to the public's right to the shore.63
English common law adopted the Roman principle of Public Trust,
and made the dual interests in tidal lands more specific. It divided
the title of waters and submerged lands into two sets of rights: the
jus privatum, or private rights, and the jus publicum, the public
rights. 64 The King held both, but he had the power to do with thejus
privatum what he wished, while he held the jus publicum only in
trust for public benefit. 65 Although English common law tended to
increase the rights of private citizens, the jus publicum remained
the dominant title. Thus, private use could not legally infringe on
the public's rights in submerged lands. 67 Accordingly, any land-
owner with jus privatum title in shoreline property held it "subject to
the I'us publicum], and [could] assert no vested right to use those
rights in a manner harmful to the trust.",6 8 Thus, even at common
law, shoreline owners had no right to harm trust land or the public's
ability to use it.
The Public Trust Doctrine persisted as the common law extended
into America. The seminal U.S. Supreme Court case Shively v.
Bowlby6 9 described the transition of the doctrine from England to the
United States. Specifically, the English claimed what they found in
America "by right of discovery," vesting all "vacant" lands in the
King, including submerged lands. 70 After the American Revolution,
the rights of the King (not reserved for the union) vested in the co1-
62. Id.. at 2.1.3.
63. Id., at 2.1.4 (allowing the public to moor boats and run ropes from trees on
the banks of rivers, although "ownership of the banks [was] vested in the adjacent
landowners"); Butler, supra note 55, at 858.
64. LORD HALE, DE JURE MARIS 19, reprinted in STUART MOORE, A HISTORY
OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 389 (1888); see Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894) (quoting HALE, supra, at 25, 36); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.
v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892) (quoting HALE, supra, at 22).
65. Shively, 152 U.S. at 11.
66. JOSEPH ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS
AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 17 (1826) (The policy of the common law
was "to assign to every thing capable of occupancy and susceptible of ownership a
legal and certain proprietor.").
67. Shively, 152 U.S. 1 at 11-13 (citing HALE, supra note 64); Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 146 U.S. at 458 (quoting HALE, supra note 64, at 22).
68. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,
721 (Ca. 1983).
69. Shively, 152 U.S. at 14.
70. Id. at 14.
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nies, including the rights and responsibilities embodied in the dual
titles in Public Trust lands.71 Among the original states, there was
"no universal and uniform law" governing the Public Trust. 72 As
long as they protected the jus publicum, each of the new states had
the power to deal with trust lands "according to its own views of
justice and policy."'7 3 Thus, they had the authority to define exactly
which lands were held in Public Trust and recognize the scope of the
jus publicum uses as they saw fit.74 As new states have joined the
union, they have come in on "equal footing" with the original colo-
nies, with the same powers and fundamental duties.75  Thus, Ha-
wai'i, with authority equal to the original states, has the power to
interpret the Public Trust Doctrine.76
B. Hawai'i's Interpretation of the Common Law Public Trust
Doctrine
Hawai'i has the power to define exactly which lands are held in
trust, and the scope of the public's rights in those lands. 77 Conse-
quently, the state has the authority to deal with its Public Trust lands
according to its own views of justice and policy, subject to the limi-
tation that its responsibility to protect the jus publicum is "inalien-
able," just as it was for the King at common law.78 Thus, Hawai'i
holds title to submerged lands, but holds the jus publicum as a trus-
tee, with the corresponding trust obligation to protect it. 79
1. Traditional Aspects of Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has strongly affirmed the Public Trust
Doctrine's applicability in the state and acknowledged the doctrine's
71. Id. at 14-15.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
75. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
76. Id.; see McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 194-95, 504 P.2d
1330, 1343 (1973). (tracing the Public Trust Doctrine from Roman through Eng-
lish to American law and Hawaiian law).
77. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 475.
78. MOoRE, supra note 64, at 435.
79. I11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); see Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Ca. 1983).
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roots in Roman and English law.8 0 Generally, Hawai'i has adopted
the common law of England, subject to state and federal constitu-
tional and statutory law, as well as traditional Hawaiian custom.81
As early as 1899, the Supreme Court for the Republic of Hawai'i
acknowledged the Public Trust principles set out in the U.S. Su-
preme Court's Illinois Central Railroad v. State of Illinois8 2 deci-
sion.
In particular, the Hawai'i Supreme Court followed the rule of Illi-
nois Central, that a sovereign's title in submerged lands:
... is different from the title which [it] hold[s] in the pub-
lic lands which are open to preemption in sale. It is a title
held in trust for the people of the state that they may en-
joy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties.
8 3
In addition, the court acknowledged the rule that, "control of prop-
erty in which the public has an interest cannot be relinquished by
transfer .... The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can
never be lost," except to promote the public interest in the trust
84land. Thus, the State has no power to transfer the public interest in
trust land, unless that transfer ultimately benefits the public's use of
that land. Just as it was at common law, the public's rights, orjus
publicum, is the dominant title in Hawai'i, for "if the public trust is
to retain any meaning and effect, it must recognize enduring public
rights in trust resources separate from, and superior to, the prevailing
private interests in the resources at any given time." 85 Thus, in Ha-
wai'i and at common law, when public and private interests in trust
lands conflict, the public's needs prevail.
80. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 128, 9 P.3d 409, 440
(2000).
81. HAw. REv. STAT. § 1-1 (1993).
82. King v. Oahu Railway, 11 Haw. 717, *5 (1899) (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 146 U.S. at 452).
83. Id. (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452).
84. Id. (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453).
85. In re Water Use, 94 Haw. at 138, 9 P.3d at 450 (emphasis added); see
Oahu Ry., 11 Haw. 717 at *5 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453); see
also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456 (noting any riparian rights "must be en-
joyed in due subjection to the rights of the public"); see also ANGELL, supra note
66, at 33-34; SLADE ET AL., supra note 55, at 237.
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The State of Hawai'i has an inalienable duty to protect submerged
lands, particularly against private interests. Specifically, Hawai'i is
a "trustee" with "the duty to protect and maintain the trust property
and regulate its use." 86 The state has no power to legislate this duty
away, and any attempt to affect, modify, or diminish the state's con-
trol over the jus publicum is void. 7 Moreover, Hawai'i may only
use its control over submerged land if it "can be done without sub-
stantial impairment of the interest of the public."88 Thus, though the
state has rights in submerged lands, its responsibility to the public
dominates those rights.8 9 "Just as private trustees are judicially ac-
countable to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the leg-
islative and executive branches are judicially accountable for the
dispositions of the public trust." 90 The state's first duty is to protect
trust assets; ultimately, this is a "categorical imperative and a pre-
condition to all [other] considerations."91  In addition, it is not
enough to protect them superficially or temporarily, for "[t]he bene-
ficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations, but those
to come." 92 The State of Hawai'i has no power to act in a way that
jeopardizes the public's long-term rights in submerged lands, par-
ticularly for the benefit of shoreline property owners, whose private
interests are necessarily overridden by the public's rights.
2. Particularized Aspects of Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine
Every state has the power to interpret essential aspects of the Pub-
lic Trust Doctrine according to its own notions of justice and pol-
icy.93 Although Hawai'i follows the common law "majority" rule in
many aspects of the doctrine, "[g]reat caution . . . is necessary in
applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another," for
each state interprets the Public Trust differently. 94 Indeed, Hawai'i's
policy has been to favor "extending to public use and ownership as
86. Kobayashi v. Zinring, 58 Haw. 106, 120-22, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (1977).
87. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 460; Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 718-19 (Ca. 1983).
88. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1894).
89. In re Water Use, 94 Haw. 135-36, 9 P.3d at 447-48.
90. In re Waiola 0 Molokai, Inc., 103 Haw. 401, 421-22, P.3d 664, 684-85
(2004) (emphasis added).
91. In re Water Use, 94 Haw. 135-36, 9 P.3d at 447-48.
92. In re Waiola, 103 Haw. at 421-22, 83 P.3d at 684-85.
93. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
94. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
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much of Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably possible."95 In addi-
tion, when applying the common law of real property in Hawai'i,
one must take particular care to examine the possible implications of
traditional Hawaiian usage, for here, even some of the most en-
trenched tenets of western real property law, such as the right to ex-
clude, do not carry their traditional weight. 96
Hawaiian custom had parallels to the common law dual title in
trust lands. Indeed, under ancient law, the King of Hawai'i could
transfer "[h]is private or feudatory right as an individual participant
in the ownership" of a trust resource, a right similar to the jus priva-
turn. In contrast, the King could not transfer his "sovereign preroga-
tives as head of the nation." Similar to thejus publicum, "these pre-
rogatives, powers and duties . . . [h]is majesty ... [could not] sur-
render." 97 Thus, although the foregoing is based on ancient Hawai-
ian custom, the King's simultaneous rights in and responsibilities to
trust resources echoes the common law Public Trust jus privatum
andjus publicum dichotomy. Ultimately, whether based on common
law or traditional Hawaiian custom, the sovereign of Hawai'i, be it
the King or the state, has a duty to protect submerged lands, inde-
pendent of any private interest in the property it may hold.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court interpreted the common law and tradi-
tional Hawaiian custom to find the Public Trust at the shoreline is
bounded by the highest wash of the waves. In particular, in its 1968
In re Ashford98 decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that
"based on ancient tradition, custom and usage, the location ... divid-
ing private land and public beaches was along the upper reaches of
the wash of the waves." 99 Five years later, in County of Hawaii v.
Sotomura,100 the court interpreted Ashford as "a judicial recognition
of long-standing public use of Hawaii's beaches ... that has ripened
into a customary right.'1°1 Additionally, the Sotomura court also
95. County of Haw. v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 181-82, 517 P.2d 57, 61-62
(1973).
96. HAW. REV. STAT. §1-1 (1993); see, e.g., Public Access Shoreline Haw. v.
Haw. County Planning Commission, 79 Haw. 425, 447, 903 P.2d 1246, 1268
(1995) (concluding "that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally ap-
plicable in Hawai'i").
97. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 185, 504 P.2d 1330, 1338
(1973).
98. Application of Ashford, 50 Haw. 314,440 P.2d 76 (1968).
99. Id. at 77.
100. Sotomura, 55 Haw. at 182, 517 P.2d at 61.
101. Id.
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held that, similar to Roman law, in Hawai'i, the highest tidal water
mark is the boundary of the shoreline Public Trust. 10 2 Thus, the
court in Sotomura resolved the boundaries incident to the common
law and traditional Hawaiian approaches to submerged lands: each
doctrine has the high water mark as its boundary.
In accordance with common law and ancient Hawaiian custom,
Hawai'i has extended the physical scope of the Public Trust lands to
its maximum -- to the highest wash of the highest wave of the year.
Specifically, the court in Sotomura noted that "while the debris line
may change from day to day or from season to season, the vegetation
line is a more permanent monument, its growth limited by the year's
highest wash of the waves."' 0 3 This definition lends a time dimen-
sion to shoreline determination, indicating that it is not the current
high water mark that delineates the trust lands, but the high water
mark over time that decides the boundary. Since Sotomura, the leg-
islature has codified this time-dependent definition of "shoreline" as
"the upper reaches of the wash of the waves, other than storm and
seismic waves, at high tide during the season of the year in which the
highest wash of the waves occurs."' 1 4 In practice, the shoreline in
Hawai'i is the debris line or the vegetation line, whichever is further
inland.'0 5
The Public Trust applies to submerged lands just as strongly as it
does to the sea, and includes all land touched by waves not caused
by natural disasters. Specifically, with tides varying nearly three feet
a day during full moon in the winter, much of the "submerged" Pub-
lic Trust land is often dry and available for public use. 106 Neverthe-
less, the fact that it is dry does not diminish its status as trust land,
nor the state's responsibility to protect it.107 Indeed, in Sotomura,
102. Compare JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES, supra note 60, at 2.1.3 (extending the
Public Trust "as far as the highest winter tide") with Sotomura, 55 Haw. at 183,
517 P.2d at 63; see HAW. REv. STAT. § 205A-1 (1993) (defining shoreline as
"[t]he upper reaches of the wash of the waves, other than storm and seismic
waves, at high tide during the season of the year in which the highest wash of the
waves occurs"); In re Sanborn, 57 Haw. 585, 592-93, 562 P.2d 771, 776 (1977).
103. Sotomura, 55 Haw. at 182, 517 P.2d at 62.
104. Aw. REv. STAT. § 205A-1.
105. Compare Diamond v. State, 112 Haw. 161, 145 P.3d 704 (2006), with
Sotomura, 55 Haw. at 180, 517 P.2d at 57.
106. See National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, Tides & Currents,
http://tidesandcuffents.noaa.gov/data-menu.shtml?stn= 1612340%2OHonolulu,%2
OHI&type=Historic%2OTide%2OData (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
107. Sotomura, 55 Haw. at 183, 517 P.2d at 63.
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the Hawai'i Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that "[i]and
below the high water mark, like flowing water, is a natural resource
owned by the state subject to, but in some sense in trust for, the en-
joyment of certain public rights."'10 8 In addition, the court in In re
Water Use Permit Applications ("Waihole") specifically indicated
that preservation of tidal lands in their natural state is indeed within
the scope of the Public Trust. 09 Thus, though only lands touched by
waves are included in the Public Trust, the state is still obligated to
protect those lands, not just the sea.
Naturally, the boundaries of the Public Trust thus defined are sub-
ject to change as the land-sea boundary evolves. "10 For instance, as
land accretes, the Public Trust moves seaward.'1 Similarly, avul-
sion, a sudden extreme seaward shift in oceanfront land, as occurs
when lava flows into the sea and hardens, also moves the Public
Trust seaward. 112  In contrast, erosion moves the Public Trust
inland. 113 Consequently, the Public Trust lands are constantly mov-
ing, seaward from accretion or avulsion, or landward from erosion.
Ownership of land at the shore is dynamic as well. Generally, ac-
creted land belongs to the state; however, shoreline landowners may
get the benefit of accretion if it is restores previously eroded land. 1
14
Additionally, in Kobayashi v. Zimring,1 15 the Hawai'i Supreme
Court held that avulsion belongs to the state."16 Though the state
holds new land created by accretion or avulsion in trust for the pub-
lic, only the land subject to tidal influence will be part of the shore-
line Public Trust."7 Similarly, "[w]hen the sea gradually and im-
perceptibly encroaches upon the land, the loss falls upon the littoral
owner, and land thus lost by erosion returns to ownership of the
state."' 1 8  Accordingly, property rights once held by a shoreline
landowner in fee simple absolute can overnight, with the simple
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 133, 9 P.3d 409, 448
(2000).
110. SLADE ET AL., supra note 55, at 108.
111. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 35 (1894).
112. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 124-25, 566 P.2d 725, 737 (1977).
113. County of Haw. v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 180, 517 P.2d 57, 59 (1973).
114. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 669-1(e) (Supp. 2007).
115. Kobayashi, 58 Haw. at 106, 566 P.2d at 725.
116. See generally id.
117. Id. at737.
118. Sotomura, 55 Haw. at 177, 517 P.2d at 59.
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wash of a wave, pass to the state. Thus, as the shoreline changes,
private and public rights in the surrounding area change with it.
The basis for the mobile boundary of the Public Trust is that when
Hawai'i ceded its land at annexation, it ceded both choate and incho-
ate property to the union. 119 Specifically, at the time of annexation,
"the Republic had an interest in any lands to be added to the Terri-
tory of the Hawaiian Islands."'' 2 0  Thus, when the Republic ceded
"all ... public property of every kind and description ... together
with every right and appurtenancy thereunto" to the United States, it
ceded its interest in future property of the state as well, including
those lands created by avulsion and claimed by erosion. 121 When
that right to future land was returned to Hawai'i at statehood, it came
back imprinted with the State's common law rights and responsibili-
ties under the Public Trust Doctrine. 122 Hence, any time nature acts
to move the shoreline, the Public Trust moves with it, even though
the actual land in question was not part of the trust at the moment of
statehood.
In general, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has liberally defined the
Public Trust Doctrine, extending it to realms removed from the sea.
In particular, the court in Waihole held that Hawai'i's Public Trust
includes "all water resources without exception or distinction," thus
defining the doctrine to include freshwater resources.1 23 Waihole
also left an opening for an expansive interpretation of Public Trust
Doctrine in Hawai'i. The court relied on article XI, section 1 of the
Hawai'i State Constitution, which indicates, "all public resources are
held in trust by the state for the benefit of its people."'' 24 The Wai-
hole court explicitly affirmed that the trust thus referred to is the
Public Trust. 125 The court then declined to define the "full extent"
of the constitution's reference to "all public resources," implying
that it is willing to extend the Public Trust beyond tidal lands and
fresh water.126 Later, the Hawai'i Supreme Court reaffirmed this
reading of Public Trust into the constitution when, in Morgan v.
119. Napeahi v. Paty, 921 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1990).
120. Kobayashi, 58 Haw. at 123, 566 P.2d at 736.
121. Id. at 122, 566 P.2d at 735-36 (citing the Joint Resolution of Annexation).
122. Id. at 124, 566 P.2d at 736.
123. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 133, 9 P.3d 409, 445
(2000).
124. HAW. CONST., art XI, § 1.
125. In re Water Use, 94 Haw. at 133, 9 P.3d at 445.
126. See id.
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Planning Department, 127 it explicitly stated that "[tihe scope of Ha-
wai'i's Public Trust doctrine is set forth in article XI, section 1 of the
Hawai'i Constitution."' 28 Although this liberal interpretation of the
doctrine may not be particularly relevant to traditional applications
of the Public Trust on the coast, it does give some context to the ju-
dicial approach to the doctrine in our state. Indeed, if the Public
Trust is to extend to "all public resources," as held in Waihole and
Morgan, then Hawai'i courts are likely apply it firmly at the shore-
line, its most traditional setting.
Thus, Hawai'i has embraced the Public Trust Doctrine, both as a
common law right and duty of statehood, and as a customary right
and duty of the sovereign power of Hawai'i. The doctrine protects
not only the ocean water, but also any land that is touched by waves
at any point in the year, with few exceptions. It is the state's duty to
protect these submerged lands for the benefit of the public, against
all private interests, including those of oceanfront landowners, even
if those landowners are poised to lose buildings to the sea.
IV. ANALYSIS
The public has inalienable rights in land destroyed by seawalls. In
Hawai'i, wet sand recreation is a protected part of the jus publicum,
with which private uses must not interfere. Seawalls that interfere
with recreation must be prohibited, notwithstanding current conflict-
ing statutes and practices. Permitting shoreline owners to build, but
requiring that they allow their structures to be claimed by the sea if it
encroaches upon them, is the most equitable way to resolve the ten-
sion between public and private interests at the shore. It gives land-
owners reasonable use of their property, precludes Fifth Amendment
takings claims, and, most importantly, it fulfills the State's duty to
preserve beaches for present and future generations.
A. Beach Loss Substantially Impairs the Shoreline Jus Publicum
The Public Trust Doctrine protects both recreational and commer-
cial uses of wet sand beaches, and those uses suffer when beaches
are lost. While the doctrine does not protect every use of trust land,
127. Morgan v. Planning Dept., County of Kauai, 104 Haw. 173, 86 P.3d 982
(2004).
128. Id at 184n.12, 86P.3dat 993n.12.
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it can evolve to meet changing public needs. The doctrine did not
protect recreation at common law; it protected navigation and com-
merce. Nevertheless, many states have interpreted the jus publicum
to include recreation. In addition, recreation is commerce in Ha-
wai'i, and accordingly, it is a protected use, even under the tradi-
tional definition of thejus publicum.
Public Trust is a dynamic doctrine. Although it traditionally pro-
tected "navigation, commerce and fishing,"1 29 the U.S. Supreme
Court has acknowledged the modem rule is "that the States have
interests in lands beneath tidal waters which have nothing to do with
navigation, '30 and that states have the authority to determine the
scope of thejus publicum. 131 Ultimately, the Public Trust "evolve[s]
in tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses
of waterways,"' 32 and is "sufficiently flexible to encompass chang-
ing public needs."'1 33 Accordingly, the jus publicum is not limited to
the traditional Public Trust uses. 134 Indeed, the United States Su-
preme Court has validated state interpretations of the doctrine that
include such diverse uses as bathing, swimming, recreation, and fish-
ing.135 As recreational uses of beaches have become increasingly
important to our society, states have begun to protect them as part of
the jus publicum.
The Public Trust Doctrine in Hawai'i probably includes recrea-
tional use of wet sand areas adjacent to the ocean. For instance,
dicta in Zimring indicated that the court would include recreation as
a Public Trust use; when discussing the trust, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court noted "the State as trustee has the duty to protect and maintain
the trust property and regulate its use. Presumptively, this duty is to
be implemented by devoting the land to actual public uses, e.g., rec-
reation." 136 Thus, the supreme court has clearly contemplated rec-
reation as part of the jus publicum. In addition, the court in Soto-
mura recognized that the modem public has a customary right to use
Hawai'i's beaches; accordingly, that modem right probably includes
129. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,
719 (Ca. 1983).
130. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988).
131. Id. at 474-75.
132. Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 482.
136. Kobayashi v. Zinring, 58 Haw. 106, 120-22, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (1977).
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modem recreational beach use. 137 Ultimately, Hawai'i appears pre-
pared to include recreation as a protectedjus publicum use.
Other jurisdictions faced with the issue have interpreted the Public
Trust Doctrine to include recreational uses in thejus publicum. 138 In
particular, in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association,13 9 the
New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the premise that the Public
Trust Doctrine includes "bathing, swimming, and other shore activi-
ties" 140 to conclude that the public has the right to pass over private
property to access the beach for recreation. 14  Similarly, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court based its definition of the jus publicum on
"public recognition," thereby including not only recreation, but "the
preservation of... lands in their natural state," as uses protected by
the doctrine. 142 Accordingly, New Jersey and California have di-
rectly included recreational use of the wet sand as part of the jus
publicum.
Even if recreation was not directly covered by Hawai'i's Public
Trust Doctrine, it would probably be indirectly protected as com-
merce. Commerce is a quintessential Public Trust use. 143 Because
recreational tourism is such a vital part of Hawai'i's economy, rec-
reational use of beaches must be included in the jus publicum, even
if only indirectly. Specifically, tourism accounts for approximately
twenty-five percent of Hawai'i's economy, 144 and "the disappear-
ance of Waikiki Beach to erosion could cost the tourism industry
nearly 2 billion annually in lost visitor spending, trigger more than
6,000 job losses and shrink state tax revenues by about $125 million
137. County of Haw. v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 182, 517 P.2d 57, 61 (1973)
(emphasis added).
138. See generally Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass 'n, 471 A.2d 355
(N.J. 1984); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 709; Morse v. Or. Division of State
Lands, 581 P.2d 520 (Ct. App. Or. 1978); Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm 'n, 199
So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1969); but see Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass.
1974) (advising legislature that lateral beach access not a protected public trust
use).
139. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 355.
140. Id. at 363.
141. Id. at 364.
142. Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2dat 719.
143. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 128, 9 P.3d 409, 440
(2000) (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
144. David W. Chen, A Nation Challenged: Tourism; Hawaii Reels as Events
on Distant Shores Keep its Beaches Bare, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 2001, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9FO3EFD6163DF93AAI 575ACO
A9679C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2.
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a year." 145 Hence, recreational tourism is an essential part of com-
merce in Hawai'i. Indeed, the state has already paid a half million
dollars to replenish sand on Khi6 beach in Waiki'ki, 146 and Kyoya
Hotels and Resorts, owner of the Sheraton Waiki'ki, is planning a $3
million dollar sand restoration project for the area in front of their
hotel. 147 Kyoya is not spending millions on sand out of good will;
on the contrary, the investment is designed to make its hotel more
attractive to tourists. Hawai'i's economy is dependent on its tour-
ists, and tourists want sand. Hawai'i's economy is indeed tied to,
and even dependent on, its sand. Ultimately, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court would probably include recreation directly in thejus publicum.
But even if it did not, the link between beaches and commerce in
Hawai'i is so well established, the court would almost certainly pro-
tect recreation indirectly as commerce.
Ultimately, when beaches are lost, both commerce and recreation
suffer from the resulting pressure on remaining beaches. Back in
2007, more than seven million people a year were visiting Hawai'i,
causing the Hawai'i Tourism Authority to comment that the state
was, "about at its limits."1 48 Rex Johnson, president and chief ex-
ecutive officer of the authority, was quoted in local papers saying,
"[ilf you get beyond [7.5 million tourists a year], you have impacted
the residents' way of life to the point you lose this special thing
called aloha . . . . Out of the various marketplaces, we hear the
bitches gripes and complaints that aloha is not enough." 149  The
145. Mary Vorsino, Isles Face Heavy Cost for Waikiki Erosion, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://www.eturbonews.com/6621/ero-
sion-waikiki-beach-would-cut-hawaii-tourism-2-billion; see also Travis Quezon,
Beach Bucks Bingo, HONOLULU WEEKLY, April 2, 2008, at 7; see HAWAI'1
TouRisM AUTHORITY, HAWAI'I TOURISM STRATEGIC PLAN 2005-2015, at 36
(2005) available at http://www.hawaiitourismauthority.org/pdf/tsp2005_2015
final.pdf; see also, e.g., Best Places Hawaii, 10 Best Beaches in Hawaii,
http://www.bestplaceshawaii.com/tips/10best/beaches.html (last visited Feb, 13,
2009 visited Feb. 29, 2008).
146. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
147. George'Downing, Displaced to a "T", HONOLULU WEEKLY, Apr. 2, 2008,
at 6; interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
148. Kim Eaton, Tourism Authority: Visitor Numbers to Island at Infrastruc-
ture Capacity, WEST HAWAII TODAY, Jan. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.westhawaiitoday.com/articles/2008/01/12/local/localO 1.txt. Recently
however, the state's tourism industry has been declining because of economic
downturn; nevertheless, overcrowding on beaches is still an issue, particularly in
Waiki'k. Vorsino, supra note 145.
149. Id.
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amount of overcrowding from tourism was starting to diminish not
only the visitor experience, but also the quality of life for residents.
Specifically, as beaches disappear, competition for space on remain-
ing beaches naturally intensifies. In addition, when beach is lost, it
prevents lateral access, cutting other beaches off from public access,
and further concentrating beach crowds. Overcrowding from beach
loss hurts commercial tourism and recreation, and can ultimately
diminish the quality of life for residents.
Beach loss fundamentally impairs recreation and commerce, which
are protected jus publicum uses of trust land. Seawalls can cause
beach loss. 150 Hence, seawalls can harm the public title in favor of
private property, a result contrary to the dominance of thejus publi-
cum over the jus privatum. Nevertheless, the State of Hawai'i con-
tinues to allow private property owners to armor the shore.
B. Hawai 'i's Coastal Zone Management Act Does Not Override the
State 's Public Trust Duty and Has Been Inadequate to Prevent
Beach Loss
The State of Hawai'i and its counties have been breeching their
duty to protect submerged lands by allowing shoreline armoring un-
der the Hawai'i Coastal Zone Management Act' 51 ("CZMA"). The
CZMA, the law governing the shore, does not supplant the govern-
ment's trust duty. That duty cannot be legislated away. While the
CZMA does include language intending to protect beaches, it also
allows landowners to armor the shore, and the state and counties
continue to permit seawalls under the act. By doing so, the govern-
ment is failing to protect submerged lands and the jus publicum
rights therein.
1. The State's Duty to Protect the Trust is Inalienable and Exists
Independently of the CZMA
States may not abdicate their responsibilities to the Public Trust.
The U.S. Supreme Court made that clear in Illinois Central, which
concerned title to a part of Lake Michigan filled and developed by a
railroad company. The state argued the railroad was "encroaching
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 205A-1 to -71 (1993, Supp. 2007).
152. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 433 (1892).
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upon the domain of the state" by occupying submerged lands.' 5 3 It
made that argument, even though it was the state legislature that
granted the railroad "all the right and title of the state in and to the
submerged lands" in question. 154 Ultimately, the court held that,
legislation to the contrary notwithstanding, the government had no
power to dispose of the submerged land because that land was part
of the Public Trust. 155 "The control of the state for the purposes of
the trust," to protect thejus publicum, "can never be lost,' 5 regard-
less of legislation to the contrary:
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested, like navigable wa-
ters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely un-
der the use and control of private parties... than it can
abdicate its police powers in administration of govern-
ment and the preservation of peace. 1
57
It is an inherent duty of a sovereign American state to protect thejus
publicum in Public Trust lands. A state cannot surrender this type of
duty by deed or legislation.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court followed Illinois Central in Waihole,
and held the state had to protect the Public Trust, despite legislation
partially abdicating that duty. Specifically, the Waihole court re-
jected an argument that the water code "subsumes and supplants
whatever common law doctrine of public trust may have previously
existed in Hawai'i.', 158 Indeed, the court specifically held that there
are powers and duties connected to the Public Trust Doctrine that the
state "cannot legislatively abdicate," and that the Public Trust is "an
inherent attribute of sovereign authority that the government ought
not, and ergo, cannot surrender." 159 Thus, under both federal and
Hawai'i law, the state cannot legislate away the power and duties
imposed by the Public Trust Doctrine. The State of Hawai'i remains
153. Id. at438.
154. Id. at450.
155. Id. at453.
156. Id.
157. King v. Oahu Ry. & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717, 724 (1899); In re Water Use
Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 128, 9 P.3d 409, 440 (2000) (quoting Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453).
158. In re Water Use, 94 Haw. at 130, 9 P.3d at 442.
159. Id. at 131 (internal punctuation omitted).
2009]
326 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW
duty bound to protect beaches, despite any purported authority to the
contrary in the CZMA.
2. There is an Inherent Conflict in the CZMA: It Contains Both a
Policy Prohibiting Seawalls and a Process for Obtaining One
The CZMA is full of language intended to protect and preserve
coastal resources. Specifically, the objectives of the act include pro-
tecting coastal ecosystems, reducing erosion hazards, and protecting
beaches.160  Additionally, the act has specific policies promoting
adequate public access along the coast. 1 1 This should mean that
the CZMA prohibits seawalls on chronically eroding shores because
they interfere with coastal ecosystems, increase erosion hazards, de-
stroy beaches, and interrupt lateral access. 62 Indeed, the act outright
prohibits "private erosion-protection structures" on trust land unless
they do no harm to "existing recreational and waterline activities." 163
All this might imply that a landowner could never build a seawall in
Hawai'i under the CZMA. 164 Nonetheless, the state and counties are
failing to implement the policies and objectives of the CZMA by
permitting several seawalls per year. 1
65
There is a jurisdictional wrinkle in the picture: the state is respon-
sible for permitting from the shoreline' 66 seaward, while the counties
are responsible from the shoreline inland. 167 In most cases, this
leaves virtually all shoreline permitting under the jurisdiction of the
counties. 168 However, depending on how far the sea has encroached
on private property, landowners may need to build seaward of the
shoreline to protect their structures. Thus, if a landowner wants to
build a seawall inland of the shoreline, he or she must apply to the
county. Conversely, to build seaward of the shoreline, a landowner
must apply to the state.
160. HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-2(b)(4)(A), -2(b)(6)(A), -2(b)(9)(A) (1993).
161. HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-21; § 205A-2(c)(1)(B)(iii).
162. See supra Part II.B.
163. HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-2(c)(9)(B).
164. Fletcher, On the Shores, supra note 6.
165. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
166. See supra Part III.B.2.
167. HAW. REv. STAT. § 205A-22.
168. Mahuiki v. Planning Comm'n of Kauai, 65 Haw. 506, 517, 654 P.2d 874,
881 (1982); see DAVID L. CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE 75 (Univ. of Haw.
Press 1994).
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Under the CZMA, the state is only directly responsible for the
shoreline area seaward; however, its duty to protect Public Trust re-
sources extends to anything that affects them, and cannot be entirely
delegated to the counties landward of the shore. 169 However, the
counties still have responsibilities to the trust, as explained by the
Hawai'i Supreme Court in Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners.170 In
that case, seaside development on the Big Island repeatedly caused
sediment damage to the adjoining reef. A citizen sued the county,
arguing that it had "breeched its Public Trust duties" by not prevent-
ing the damage. 17 1 Although the county argued that only the state
has Public Trust duties, the court disagreed, holding the county "has
a duty, as a political subdivision of the State, to protect" Public Trust
resources.'7  Accordingly, in Hawai'i, both the counties and the
state are responsible for the protection of the Public Trust: the state
generally, and the counties from the shoreline inland.
Despite the protective language in the CZMA objectives and poli-
cies section discussed above, some counties have been reluctant to
enforce the act. For instance, in Mahuiki v. Planning Commis-
sion,173 the supreme court reviewed a case from Kaua'i where, de-
spite the County Planning Commission's "serious misgivings" over
a development's "compatibility with a policy to preserve and protect
the environment and resources of the coastal zone," and their wistful
desire to "have the guts" to prevent the damage, the Commission
granted it a shoreline Special Management Area development permit
under the CZMA. The supreme court later remanded the permit to
the Commission to either deny it, or make the required finding that
the development would have "no substantial adverse environmental
or ecological effect," or that such an effect would be "clearly out-
weighed by public health and safety."' 174 Even though the Commis-
sion clearly had the authority to deny the permit based on the pro-
ject's adverse environmental effects, it did not have the "guts" to do
so. Ultimately, government can be reluctant to deny permits to pow-
erful shoreline landowners, even when the CZMA gives them the
authority to do so.
169. See supra Part IV.B.1.
170. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Haw. 205, 140 P.3d 985 (2006).
171. Id. at 220, 140 P.3d at 1000.
172. Id. at 226, 140 P.3d at 1006.
173. Mahuiki, 65 Haw. at 506, 654 P.2d at 875.
174. Id. at 519, P.2d at 882-83.
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The actual language of the CZMA fails to draw the hard lines nec-
essary to protect Public Trust resources. For instance, the act re-
quires the counties to "minimize, where reasonable ... [a]ny devel-
opment which would reduce the size of any beach... [and a]ny de-
velopment which would reduce or impose restrictions upon public
access to tidal and submerged lands [and] beaches."1 75 Unfortu-
nately, minimizing beach destruction where reasonable does not
achieve the outright prohibition on government sanctioned wet sand
beach destruction that the Public Trust Doctrine demands. Restrict-
ing public access to tidal and submerged lands is an outright im-
pairment of thejus publicum. Neither the state nor the counties have
the power to endorse such impairment, reasonable, minimized, or
otherwise.
Additionally, the CZMA process for armoring focuses on the hard-
ship to the landowner if no armoring is allowed, not the impact of
armoring on coastal resources. Specifically, a county may grant a
variance for a seawall if "shoreline erosion is likely to cause hard-
ship to the applicant if the facilities or improvements are not al-
lowed"'176 between the shoreline and the building setback. 177 Such a
seawall will eventually destroy Public Trust resources if placed on an
eroding sandy shoreline. Granted, it is a hardship to watch as one's
shoreline structure is washed away, but that hardship is a private
one, and cannot outweigh the public's hardship as beaches through-
out the state are systematically sacrificed for the benefit of private
landowners.
Landowners can circumvent the proper process for these variances
if they wait long enough to request armoring. A public hearing,
which would otherwise be required to grant the variance necessary
for a seawall, may be waived if the application is for "[p]rotection of
a legal structure costing more than $20,000; provided the structure is
at risk of immediate damage from shoreline erosion." 178 This shore-
line armoring should never be permitted on a sandy chronically erod-
ing shoreline because such armoring causes beach loss. 179 Neverthe-
less, the state Department of Land and Natural Resources allows
property owners with habitable structures threatened by erosion to
armor with sandbags without going before the agency's board for
175. HAw. REv. STAT. § 205A-26(3)(B) to (C) (1993).
176. HAw. REV. STAT. § 205A-46(a)(9) (2008).
177. HAw. REv. STAT. § 205A-41 (2008).
178. HAw. REv. STAT. § 205A-43.5(a)(2) (2008).
179. See supra Part I.
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consideration. °8 0  That board should be carefully considering any
request for armoring. It should determine the effects of the armoring
on coastal resources, and hear public testimony to determine what
the public uses of the shoreline area are, if those uses are protected
under the Public Trust Doctrine, and if the proposed armoring will
interfere with them. Currently, there is no procedural guarantee that
the public's rights will be considered. Thejus publicum is the domi-
nant title, and the public's interests in coastal lands must not only be
considered, but must also win out over private ones, even if it means
destruction of a structure worth $20,000 or more.
By allowing seawalls under the CZMA, the state and its subdivi-
sions are breeching their duty to protect submerged lands. Although
the CZMA purports to protect beaches and coastal resources, its pro-
visions render it ineffective in achieving its objectives and carrying
out its policies. This cannot be; the CZMA cannot supplant the
state's Public Trust duty. Seawalls that cause beach loss impair the
public's dominant interest in Public Trust lands in favor of private
landowners. Allowing such walls, even under the CZMA, is a clear
violation of the Public Trust Doctrine. Ultimately, there is a better
way to manage coastal erosion: rather than sacrificing thejus publi-
cum to protect private property, allow coastal landowners to use their
property while it is still there, but force them to accept that if the sea
comes for their buildings, they must let them go.
C. Allowing Shoreline Owners to Build but then
Forbidding Harmful Armoring is Preferable to Other Methods of
Preserving Beaches
The conflict is clear: the ocean is coming for shoreline struc-
tures,18 1 and government must respond. Presently, the state and
counties are issuing permits for seawalls to protect private property
at the expense of the public's interest in submerged lands, in viola-
tion of the Public Trust Doctrine. This cannot continue; it is a bla-
tant breech of the state's trust duty, and leaves government vulner-
able to citizen suits. 82 Dr. Fletcher, an active participant in the
180. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9; Interview with Dr. Fletcher II,
supra note 22.
181. See EILEEN L. SHEA ET AL., supra note 10, at 32; see also El-Mohamady
Eid & Cornelis H. Hulsbergen, supra note 10, at 305; see supra Part II.
182. See, e.g., Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Haw. 205, 140 P.3d 985
(2006).
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coastal erosion conversation, has suggested increased shoreline set-
backs and a mitigation fund paid into by landowners when their
seawalls destroy beaches as possible approaches to the issue.,8 3 Al-
though this desire to preserve beaches in a way fair to landowners is
laudable, shoreline setbacks and mitigation funds are ultimately un-
workable. A solution that strikes the proper balance between private
and public interests allows landowners to use their land while it still
exists, but requires them to let their land and buildings go if the
shoreline encroaches upon them.
1. Shoreline Setbacks Leave Government Vulnerable to Fifth
Amendment Takings Claims and Deny Landowners Use of
Otherwise Developable Property
Substantial setbacks for shoreline development are one popular an-
swer to the problem of shoreline erosion. For instance, in Maui
County, the required setback for coastal buildings is at least twenty-
five feet plus fifty times the annual rate of erosion.' 84 Thus, on a
coast eroding two feet a year, the setback is at least one hundred and
twenty-five feet. Kaua'i has adopted a similar scheme, requiring a
setback of forty feet plus seventy times the annual rate of erosion. 185
Both rules have exceptions allowing smaller setbacks for shallow
lots. 186 Local property rights advocate and Honolulu attorney
Robert Thomas has criticized both schemes, and hinted that if the
setbacks are not applied "carefully," government would be facing
Fifth Amendment takings claims. 187 Although the setback approach
183. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
184. Maui Dept. of Planning, Shoreline Rules for the Maui Planning Comm'n §
12-203-6 available at http://www.co.maui.hi.us/documents/Planning/CZMP/SSA
% 20Rules.PDF (last visited Feb, 13, 2009).
185. Jan TenBruggencate, New Kauai Shoreline Erosion Bill Among Nation's
Most Conservative, http://raisingislands.blogspot.com/2008/02/new-kauai-
shoreline-erosion-bill-among.html (Feb. 26, 2008, 9:55 EST).
186. Maui Shoreline Rules § 12-203-6(b).
187. Posting of Robert Thomas to InverseCondemnation.com, Aggressive New
Kauai Shoreline Setback Ordinance Adopted,
http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2008/02/aggressive-
new.html (Feb. 29, 2008); Posting of Robert Thomas to InverseCondemna-
tion.com, Review of Maui Shoreline Setback Rules Underway,
http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2006/1 0/review of
maui_.html (Oct. 6, 2008).
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has otherwise met with community support, 18 and is clearly envi-
sioned in the CZMA, 189 Mr. Thomas has a point.
Depending on how government applies shoreline setbacks, they
have the potential to be compensable as either total or partial regula-
tory takings. Under the current Supreme Court interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, when regulation of land
goes "too far,"'190 the government has taken property, which entitles
the landowner to just compensation. ' 9' A regulation limiting the use
of land can be either a "total" or "partial" regulatory taking, either of
which leaves the government owing just compensation to the land-
owner.
Aggressive setbacks may be challenged as total regulatory takings.
A total regulatory taking occurs when regulation has precluded all
economically viable use of a property.192 For instance, the seminal
U.S. Supreme Court total regulatory taking case Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council193 was a challenge to an erosion-based
shoreline setback, which left a landowner's parcel in a zone where
legislation prohibited anything more than small walkways or
decks. 194 There, the Supreme Court imposed a "categorical rule"
that when regulation precludes "all economically beneficial uses"'
19 5
of a parcel of land, the owner must be compensated, regardless of
how vital the regulation is to public health and safety. 196 Although
the trial court found the regulation made the landowner's lots eco-
nomically useless, 19 7 the Supreme Court did not require the govern-
ment to compensate Lucas; it remanded the case to the lower court to
determine if an exception to the rule applied. 98 Such an exception
exists if the owner never had any right to develop in the way that the
regulation precludes; that is, if the regulation is a codification of a
"background principle" of property law, such as nuisance, custom, or
indeed, Public Trust. 199 However, when the Court remanded Lucas,
188. See, e.g., TenBruggencate, supra note 185.
189. HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-2(c)(9)(A) (1993).
190. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
191. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
192. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1008-9 n.2.
195. Id. at 1018.
196. Id. at 1026.
197. Id. at 1018.
198. Id. at 1029.
199. Seeid.
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it noted that "[i]t seems unlikely that common-law principles would
have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improve-
ments on petitioner's land., 20 0 Thus, courts may be reluctant to find
a Lucas exception to a total regulatory taking, even if the circum-
stances surrounding the regulation implicate background principles
of state law.
Alone, Public Trust principles will probably be insufficient to de-
fend government against most total takings claims based on shore-
line setbacks. Shoreline setbacks, if they are so deep and restrictive
that they prevent building on an entire parcel, could preclude all
economically beneficial uses of land. For instance, because both the
Maui 201 and Kaua'i 20 2 setback schemes have categorical minimums,
they could be challenged as total regulatory takings when applied to
extremely shallow lots. Although nuisance from tsunami or hurri-
canes causing parts of ocean-front housing to dislodge and damage
inland property is probably a viable defense to total takings claims
based on moderate setbacks, a court might not find those arguments
convincing if beach loss is the true motive behind the ordinance, as
could be argued from a more aggressive erosion-based rule.2 0 3 Ul-
timately, although Public Trust is a powerful doctrine, at the coast its
force diminishes exponentially as the distance from the shoreline
increases. To defend a setback based on the Public Trust, govern-
ment will have to establish how inland development hurts the jus
publicum. Thus, the farther inland the setback, the more difficult it
will be to defend using Public Trust principles.
Even if a setback does not preclude all building on a property,
landowners can still challenge the regulation as a partial taking. For
partial takings, "too far" is determined by the extent government has
interfered with reasonable "investment-backed expectations" and the
"character" of the regulation. 204 Ultimately, this is a fact dependant,
ad hoc inquiry, and it is difficult to predict the outcome of any par-
ticular case. 205 What is certain is that many shoreline landowners
subjected to aggressive setbacks will feel that government has sub-
200. Id. (citing Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
201. TenBruggencate, supra note 185.
202. Maui Dept. of Planning, supra note 184.
203. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992).
204. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (citing Pa.
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
205. Pa. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
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stantially hindered their ability to develop their property, and will
bring partial taking inverse condemnation lawsuits for compensa-
tion.
Landowners brought a claim with a factual inquiry similar to a par-
tial taking against the County of Kaua'i in Brescia v. N. Shore
Ohana.2 °7 In that case, a landowner's subdivision code, combined
with the county setbacks, required him to build an odd triangular-
shaped house, albeit over 4,000 square feet, to comply with all the
applicable regulations.20 8 The landowner sought a variance, arguing
he was entitled to one because he had lost "reasonable use" of his
property.20 9 Ultimately, the Hawai'i Supreme Court disagreed, and
overturned the lower court's decision granting the variance as
"clearly erroneous." 210 Although Brescia is not a takings case, it
does shed some light on the court's approach to what reasonable use
of coastal property entails. Here, we see the court unwilling to ac-
commodate a coastal landowner with an only partially usable lot.
The reasonable investment backed expectation inquiry would proba-
bly be similarly decided on similar facts.
Even if the investment backed expectation inquiry weighs against a
partial taking, courts will still consider the "character" of a regula-
tion before determining if compensation is due. 211 Specifically, if
the regulation is for health or safety, it weighs against a taking, and
if the regulation is for the public welfare, it weighs for a taking.212 It
is still unclear if counties can successfully justify erosion-based
shoreline setbacks as necessary to the public health or safety. Ulti-
mately, there is a strong argument for such an approach, as tsunamis
and hurricanes periodically do serious damage to Hawaiian
shores.213 Nevertheless, when beach loss is the true concern, as
could be argued from an erosion-based setback rule, the health and
206. Accord, e.g., Brescia v. N. Shore Ohana, 115 Haw. 477, 168 P.3d 929
(2007).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 497, 168 P.3d at 949.
209. Id.
210. Id. at499, 168 P.3d at 951.
211. Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)).
212. Id.
213. Hawaiian Volcano Observatory, The 1960 Tsunami, Hilo,
http://hvo.wr.usgs.gov/volcanowatch/1994/94_05_20.html (last visited Feb, 13,
2009); Dr. Steven Businger, Hurricanes In Hawaii, http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/
MET/Faculty/businger/poster/hurricane/ (last visited Feb, 13, 2009 visited Mar. 2,
2008).
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safety argument becomes harder to make, and welfare emerges as
the more likely basis for the regulation. This in turn shifts the bal-
ance towards finding a regulatory taking and requiring just compen-
sation.
Accordingly, aggressive shoreline setbacks will open the counties
to costly litigation over Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claims.
Although the government has a strong defense against partial takings
claims, it will probably have to pay just compensation if setbacks
preclude all economically viable use of a parcel. But even if the
government wins regulatory takings cases, it still loses, as tax dollars
and vital resources are expended in litigation that has no long-term
benefit.
There is no long-term benefit to setbacks because they do nothing
to resolve the problem of public beaches versus private land raised
by coastal erosion; they only delay the clash of public and private
interests. Ultimately, the Maui and Kaua'i setbacks only postpone
this clash for fifty or seventy years, or even less for shallow lots.
Indeed, setback exceptions for shallow lots are particularly trou-
bling; with them, government is simply sacrificing the jus publicum
so that it can avoid paying just compensation. Ultimately, shoreline
setbacks are simply inadequate to protect Public Trust resources.
2. Mitigation Funds Violate the State's Trust Duties Because They
Do Not Preserve the Jus Publicum For Future Generations
One popular, and ultimately unworkable, answer to coastal erosion
requires landowners who damage coastal resources to pay into a
mitigation fund. 1 For instance, the CZMA compels landowners to
pay into such a fund when coastal resources will be "unavoidably
damaged by... development." 215 Government may use these funds
to increase shoreline public access, restore beaches, perform re-
search, and increase coastal management.
216
The mitigation fund approach fails because the state is duty bound
to protect Public Trust resources, not only for the people of today,
but for future generations as well.2 17 Even granting the dubious
214. See Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9; see also HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 205A-2(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1993).
215. CZMA § 205 A-2(c)(1)(B)(ii).
216. Interview with Dr. Fletcher I, supra note 9.
217. In re Waiola 0 Molokai, Inc., 103 Haw. 401, 421-22, 83 P.3d 664, 684-85
(2004).
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proposition that a few thousand dollars could adequately compensate
the public for the loss of a beach, it is unlikely that any amount of
money, after filtering through the bureaucratic inefficiencies of gov-
ernment, could compensate the future generations of Hawai'i for that
loss. Ultimately, mitigation funds fail to achieve the ultimate effect
required by the Public Trust Doctrine: protection of tidal lands.
3. Allowing Shoreline Development but Forbidding Damaging
Armoring is Consistent With Hawai'i's Public Trust Doctrine and
Allows Property Owners to Use Their Land While it Still Exists
Properly implemented, the Public Trust Doctrine gives landowners
fair use of their property while it lasts, and leaves the takings to na-
ture. The doctrine is an attractive basis for managing the shore be-
cause it is background principle of state law. Thus, it provides gov-
ernment an excellent defense for all flavors of takings claims.
The primary advantage of basing shoreline management practices
on the Public Trust Doctrine is that it trumps takings claims. The
Hawai'i Supreme Court has held that the rights to Public Trust re-
sources never passed to private ownership when the western system
of property came to use in the islands.218 Rather, ownership of those
resources "remained in the people of Hawaii for their common
good." Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Public Trust Doctrine is a background principle of Washington state
law, and it precluded a regulatory taking claim because the "doctrine
ran with the title to the tideland properties and alone precluded
shoreline residential development. 2 1 9 Similarly, Hawai'i landown-
ers cannot argue that government has taken the right to harm thejus
publicum because that right was never part of their title. Not even
the state has that power. No regulation can ever take the right to
harm the public interest in tidelands from property owners because
that right does not exist.
There are also tactical advantages to a no seawall rule. Allowing
the sea to encroach on shoreline structures lets the state deal with
individual landowners as the ocean erodes their particular properties.
A facial attack on a no seawall rule is unlikely to succeed because
such a rule does not necessarily impact all coastal landowners right
218. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 185, 504 P.2d 1330, 1338
(1973).
219. Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir.
2002).
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away; landowners who have setback their structures substantially
will not be affected for many years, if ever. In contrast, shoreline
setback rules apply to everyone all at once, including the most liti-
gious, thus exposing government to litigation with the most powerful
and wealthy landowners right from the start.
Both North Carolina and Texas have been successful in imple-
menting policies forbidding shoreline armoring. Under the Texas
Open Beaches Act, no structures are allowed shoreward of the high
water mark, and the state is preparing to sue landowners to force
them to move their houses landward. In order to help mitigate
expenses, shoreline landowners may apply to the Texas General
Land Office for reimbursement up to $40,000 to relocate or demol-
ish their noncompliant structures. Similarly, shoreline armoring is
also prohibited in North Carolina.222 In Shell Island Homeowner's
Association, Inc. v. Tomlinson,223 a North Carolina shoreline land-
owner challenged that rule, alleging it was a partial regulatory taking224
of property. The trial court and the court of appeals both dis-
missed the suit, finding that landowners failed to state a viable regu-
latory takings claim.225 The North Carolina Court of Appeals rea-
soned that the state was not obligated to compensate landowners for
natural occurrences that the state did nothing to cause.226 The court
found the state was not responsible for nature's taking of the land,
despite the rule preventing shoreline armoring, because landowners
have no inherent right to armor the shore. 227 Thus, both Texas and
North Carolina have been successfully implementing no-armoring
policies.
Any apparent impracticality in a no-armoring rule is outweighed
by the fact that the landowners affected chose to invest close to the
ocean. When faced with an outright clash of rights, courts may be
220. JERRY PATTERSON, TExAs GENERAL LAND OFFICE, PLAN FOR TEXAs OPEN
BEACHES 4 (2006), available at http://www.glo.state.tx.us/news/archive/2006/
docs/PATTERSONPLAN.pdf.
221. Id.
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-1 15.1(b) (2005).
223. Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., v. Tominson, 517 S.E.2d 406 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1999).
224. Id. at 414.
225. Id. at 410, 417.
226. Id. at 415.
227. Id. at 414; Joseph J. Kalo, North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public
Waters and Beaches: The Rights of Littoral Owners in the Twenty-First Century,
83 N.C. L. REv. 1427, 1496-97 (2005).
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tempted to balance the various interests involved.228 However, a
rule requiring landowners to move their structures back, rather than
destroy the beach, is self-balancing. 229 The magnitude of a land-
owner's loss will be directly proportional to his own folly. If land-
owners risk their assets by putting them too close to the ocean, their
loss is not the public's burden. Landowners have the option of
building simple, inexpensive structures close to the water that they
can easily move back or rebuild. Alternatively, if they want to build
something very expensive, they should build it somewhere safe.
Should a landowner choose to build something very expensive right
next to the Pacific Ocean, it is a private risk. If the ocean encroaches
on that property, it is a private loss, and landowners cannot expect
the public to sacrifice its right to the jus publicum because of their
imprudence.
It is good policy for government to allow coastal development, but
then require landowners to forfeit structures if the shoreline en-
croaches on them, rather than save them at the expense of the jus
publicum. Although, when faced with destruction of property, "[i]t
is impossible for any court to fashion a legal doctrine which will
equitably compensate all victims," given "the paucity of land in our
island state and the concentration of private ownership in relatively
few citizens, a policy enriching only a few would be unwise.
23°
Indeed, it makes little sense to sacrifice beaches, which benefit all
the people of Hawai'i and its visitors, in favor of a small handful of
landowners.
V. CONCLUSION
It is fundamentally unjust to let a few private landowners destroy
beaches that rightfully belong to everyone. Nevertheless, property
owners have the right to use their land. However, they have no right
to harm the jus publicum in the Public Trust, nor does the govern-
ment have the right to let them.
228. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (weigh-
ing a property owner's right to exclude and an individual's right to free speech in a
shopping mall).
229. E-mail from Philip Reed to author (April 19, 2008, 06:30 HST) (on file
with author) (suggesting the term "self-balancing").
230. State v. Zinring, 58 Haw. 106, 120-21, 566 P.2d 725, 734-35 (1977).
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Any just response to coastal erosion must account for that very ba-
sic distribution of rights. Setbacks fail because they do not let land-
owners use their otherwise developable property, and only delay the
problem. Mitigation funds fail because they harm the jus publicum
without preserving public benefits for future generations. Allowing
property owners to use their land until doing so would harm the jus
publicum is a simple way of addressing erosion while maintaining
the proper balance between the public's rights to the shore and pri-
vate owners' rights to use their land.
Moreover, not all seawalls cause erosion. "[If one accepts the
simple proposition that nature is the arena of life and that a modi-
cum of knowledge of her processes is indispensable for survival and
rather more for existence, health and delight, it is amazing how
many apparently difficult problems present ready resolution.",231
When faced with a shoreline landowner's request to armor, govern-
ment must look to nature and to science to understand the forces at
work on that particular part of the shore, and what the effects of ar-
moring will be. If armoring will do no harm to the jus publicum,
government may allow it. By bridging the gap between law and sci-
ence, the state and counties can do justice both to coastal landown-
ers, and to current and future generations of the public.
Ultimately, landowners who invest close to the ocean must accept
the natural consequences of that decision. If the ocean erodes their
property, they must either move their structures landward, or the
shoreline seaward.232 Erosion is happening. Sea level rise is com-
ing. The hotels teetering on the shores of Waiki'ki will not last for-
ever. Nor should they be allowed to gobble the very resource that
they have profited from for so long, a resource on which our econ-
omy depends. Hotels do not make Waiki'kI special. The beach and
the ocean do.
In practice, the state and counties should use waivers and permits
to implement Public Trust principles. Government should require
coastal landowners to sign waivers indicating that they will tear
down or modify any structure within a certain distance of an eroding
shoreline. Such a waiver could be a condition of a permit issued
under the CZMA. Also, government and landowners must allow
harmful armoring to degrade. The state and counties should require
231. IAN L. MCHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE 7 (John Wiley and Sons Inc 1969)
(emphasis added).
232. But cf Downing, supra note 147, at 6-7 (discussing the negative impacts
of Waiki'ki beach replenishment on Waik'kI surf breaks and swimming).
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permits to repair or maintain any shoreline armoring. When a sea-
wall is already in place, government can directly measure and judge
how armoring has impacted the coastal environment. If it has
harmed the jus publicum, the state has no authority to issue a permit
to maintain or repair it, not in Lanikai, not in Waiki'ki, not any-
where.
Beaches and sand are even more ancient than the origins of the law
that protects them. Today, as it was in ancient Rome and ancient
Hawai'i, the public has inalienable rights in submerged lands. The
people of Hawai'i need those lands. Not only are beaches a part of
the tourist image and experience on which our economy depends,
but they are also a fundamental part of the fabric of life here. More-
over, the right to use them belongs to the people. The government
simply has no authority to take that right and hand it over to private
landowners. Nor does justice require the public to sacrifice that right
to those who chose to risk their assets at the edge of the vast and
powerful Pacific Ocean.
2009]

